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STATEMENT OP THE KIND OF CASE
This action as it is now before this Honorable Court
is to determine whether the plaintiff's attorneys are
entitled to attorneys' fees from the appellant who is the
Trustee of the cause of action upon which the plaintiff's
suit was brought, and to determine what the Trustee
of the cause of action in a Workmen's Compensation
case must do in order to protect itself against being
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required to pay attorneys' fees under an involuntary·
employment of attorneys with whom it has no contract
no attorney-client relationship and no control.
'

DIS.POSITION IN LO,VER COURT
After the filing of a "Petition" and the hearing of
argument thereon and the admitting of no oral testimon 1
or evidence but only three written exhibits, the Cou;I
below held that respondent's attorneys were entitlea
to a fee of one-third (1/3) of the amount of the sub.
rogation claim of the appellant, which is the Trustee
of the cause of action, and charged a proportionate share
of the costs against the appellant.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks to have, in the alternative,
reversal of the judgment with the finding of this Court
that the insurance company gave respondent's attorneys
adequate notice that they were not to represent tbe
appellant's interest and therefore they are not entitlea
to a fee for the recovery of the subrogation claim of the
appellant, or the judgment of the Court below set aside
and the matter remanded for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case was commenced by filing of the complaint
by the plaintiff against Harold D. Pyne and Gibbons
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& Reed Company to recover damages for the plaintiff's

injuries sustained in an automobile accident when he
was driving in the course of his employment ( R. 1-2).
The complaint was filed on November 30, 1970, the
accident having occurred on October 15, 1970, (R. 1-2).
Liberty Mutual paid W orkmens' Compensation to the
plaintiff or on his behalf in the total sum of $3,301.22
(R. 54, 64, 78, and Exhibit #2). By letter of November
16, 1970, plaintiff's attorney was put on notice that the
appellant had subrogation rights in the matter and that
it expected to participate in the terms of any settlement
and expected that the subrogation rights would be given
consideration (Exhibit #I and R. 77). By letter dated
September 9, 1971, plaintiff's attorney was advised
that appellant had its own representation and that no
fee would be paid to plaintiff's attorney on account of
any recovery for appellant, the Trustee of the cause of
the action,and any help that plaintiff's attorney desired
was offered (Exihbit #2). Thereafter, on December
3, 1971, appellant's attorney was advised that plaintiff's
attorney was not in agreement as to the participation
on fees which action precipitated filing an appearance
of record dated December 9, 1971, and an amended
appearance of record dated January 25, 1972, (R. 4.5
and R. 49) . On January 26, the date set for trial, plaintiff's attorneys, Mr. Hunt having associated with Mr.
King, the attorneys for the defendant and the attorneys
for the Trustee of the cause of action, appeared ready
for trial and a satisfactory settlement was negotiated
between the plaintiff and defendant's counsel. At that
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time, a discussion ensued between the Court and plain.
tiff's attorneys and the attorneys for the Trustee of
the caus.e uf action regarding the attorneys fees. (See
Reporters Transcript of Proceedings of January 2ti,
1972, R. 109-124) . Plaintiff's attorneys then filed in
plaintiff's name a "Petition" in which they set forth
their claim for attorney's fees against the interest of
the 'Vorkmen's Compensation carrier. Hearing was
on that petition on February 8, 1972, at which time the
only evidence introduced was introduced by appellant,
Trustee of the cause of action, which consists of Ex·
hibits #1, #2, and #3 which are letters. All of the
other content of the transcript of that hearing are argu·
ment of counsel and statements not under oath.
Subsequently, an "Order" was entered on February
18, 1972, which was not supported by Findings of Fact.
( R. 63-64) An objection to the entry of the "Order"
and a Motion for filing Findings of Fact and Conclu·
sions of Law was made (R. 68). That matter was
argued on February 29, 1972, and resulted in the Court
making the 1<...,indings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
entered herein. (R. 76-79). Thereafter, objections to
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a
motion for a new trial pursuant to Rules 50 and 52n
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was filed (R.
82-83). A hearing was had on that matter on April 13,
1972, which resulted in an order denying the objection
to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ana
denying the motion for a new trial (R. 92-93).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THERE lS NO PROPER RECORD REGARDING THE ISSUES NO\\T BEFORE THE
COURT AS THE "PETITION" FILED BY
THE PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEYS IS NOT
AUTHORIZED BY THE RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE NOR BY STATUTE AND
THERE 'VAS NO TAKING 011-. TESTIMONY
TO PROVIDE FACTS UPON 'VHICH A DECISION COULD BE MADE.
The Court below allowed the tiling of a "Petition"
in the instant action to determine a question which was
uot before the Court and which by the filing of a "Petition" could not be placed before the Court. There is
no authority in either Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
nor by statute for the filing of a "Petition" to determine
a contested matter. The issue should have been resolved
by the plaintiff's attorneys filing a complaint and commencing an action as provided by Rule 3 U.R.C.P.
(1953).

Attorney for appellant objected to the procedure
and suggested that the proper method would have been
to file a complaint with the proper pleadings to get the
issue before the Court (R. 113-119). The Court overruled the objections of appellant's counsel and in effect
held that it would proceed to hear all issues in the
petition (R. 126-127). The objections of the appellant
relate not only to the fact that there is no rule or statu-
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tory authority for the filing of the "Petition" in thh
matter, but further that, failing to commence an action
by the issua11ce of a Summons and the filing of a com.
plaint as provided by Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Court had no juris.diction to pro.
ceed in the matter.
The appearance of the appellant was special in
relation to the issues to be determined under the "Peti·
tion" (R. 126). The motion of the appellant to
for lack of jurisdiction was denied ( R. 59 and R. 76).
However, there is no finding of jurisdiction in the Find.
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, or in the Order,
and jurisdiction must therefore be assumed, although
not specially found, even though the issue was specific.
ally raised. In this regard, there is no evidence before
the Court whatsoever as to the jurisdictional facts, there
being only the argument of counsel.
Under the procedure followed by the Court below,
there was no clear cut determination of the issues by
means of filing a complaint and answer, and the usual
discovery procedures being followed. Instead, the matter
was simply argued to the Court with assumptions being
made in said arguments, but there being no evidence
other than Exhibits #1, #2, and #3. All other matters
are simply statements of counsel.
As the issues contained herein and as will be dis·
cussed later are of prime importance to Workmen's
Compensation Insurance Carriers in this State, this
matter should be remanded to the Court below for trial
6

with the issues to be framed by proper pleadings and
proper discovery procedures.
POINT II.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT FINDINGS OF FACT VI,
VII AND VIII.
If there is any basis in the record to support the
"Order" which requires the payment of fees to the
plaintiff's attorneys, they must be Findings of Fact
\'I, VII and VIII (R. 78). Finding VI is to the effect
that the settlement made in the principal case of Lanier
vs. Pyne was obtained solely by the efforts of plaintiff's attorneys and that the settlement included the
subrogation amount due the Workmen's Compensation
carrier. Finding VII sets forth that the net amount
recovered by the plaintiff was $14,000.00 less costs and
makes a finding that the amount due the Workmen's
Compensation carrier is 23.59% of the total judgment
making it responsible for $86.83 of the costs, and Finding VIII is that the compensation carriers share of
the attorneys' fee expense is that same percentage,
23.59% or $1,071.92. It is interesting to note that this
figure is also one-third of the amount that the insurance
carrier was subrogated to. In other words, the finding
of the Court imposes a one-third fee upon the amount
the insurance carrier recovered.

However, nowhere in the record is there any evidence other than statements of counsel that support the
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Findings summarized above. There is no evidence a,
to any of the Findings of Fact made in the three refer.
enced
Although Finding III specifically
notes that Exhibit #I, the Notification of the intere;1
of the insurance carrier, was mailed to plaintiff's attornev
among all other parties interested, there is no
as to whether or not that notice constituted a rejection
of his services, a hiring of his services, or what effecl
it might have had. This raises the specific and only
issue that needs to be decided by this Court and thal
is, what must a compensation insurance carrier do to
protect itself from being forced into an
employment arrangement with the plaintiff's counsel,
who by ignoring notification of the carrier's interest
and going forward with the action, can then claim that
he is entitled to a fee from the insurance carrier?
POINT III.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE REC·
ORD TO SUPPORT CONCLUSION OF LAW
NUMBER III.
As noted in Point II in discussing the Conclusiom
of Law, Conclusion of Law III is the key conclusion
that must stand in order to award attorneys' fees on the
'Vorkmen's Compensation portion of the judgment
to plaintiff's attorneys. This conclusion is again, not
supported by evidence in the record, and as a matter
of fact, at the very least, there is a question of fad
raised by the only evidence, being Exhibits #I, #2,
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and #3, as to the right of plaintiff's attorneys to go
forward in the matter and represent the interest of the
appellant. These matters should have been decided
upon a full trial with the introduction of testimony and
the specific issues having been determined. As the evidence in the record does not support the critical .Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, they obviously
must fail and the "Order" which they must support
therefore, must fail.
POINT IV.
NO ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
ESTABLISHED BETWEEN APPELLANT AND PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEYS AND
IN FACT, THEY WERE PUT ON NOTICE
THAT THEY COULD NOT ACT AS ATTORNEYS .FOR APPELLANT AND THEREFORE,
THEY CANNOT CLAIM A FEE FROM APPELLANT.
WAS

The cases heretofore decided by this Honorable
Court relating to the payment of attorneys fees for the
insurance carrier's share of the recovery have all approached the matter from the point of view that to
allow the carrier its recovery without paying a proportionate share of fees and costs would be an unwarranted windfall to the carrier resulting in an unjust
enrichment. Worthen v. Shurtleff and Andrews, Inc.,
19 Utah 2d 80, 426 P.2d 223 {1967); Graham v. Industrial Commission, 26 Utah 2d 424, 491 P.2d 223
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( 1971); Prettyman v. Utah State Department of Fi.
nance, 27 Utah 2d 333, 496 P .2d 80 ( 1972) . In none
of those cases, however, were the attorneys for the plain.
tiff put on notice by the carrier that the carrier baa
hired its own counsel and would protect its own interest
In the present case the plaintiff's attorneys were give
notice of the subrogation claim of the carrier ana
further, were given notice that the carrier had retaineo
its own counsel and that they were not to represent the
carrier, nor would the carrier participate in payment or
their fee. (Exhibits #1 and #2). As set forth in 7 Am
J ur 2d, Section 204, pg 166, "The creation of the rela·
tion of an attorney and client by contract, express or
implied, is essential to the right of an attorney to re·
cover compensation for services. In general there can
be no recovery from one who did not employ or authorize
employment of the attorney, however valuable the result
of the attorney's services may have been.... "
11

The application of the Worthen vs. Shurtleff and
Andrews, Graham vs. Industrial Commission ana
Prettyman vs. Utah State Department of Finance
(Supra) decisions to the facts in this case would result
in the impairment of the right of the insurance company
to contract with counsel of its own choice and to refuse
to deal with counsel who may have been retained by
the plaintiff and proceeded with the action with or with·
out notice to the insurance carrier.
In the instant case, there is no doubt that the plain·
tiff's attorneys knew of the interest of the insurance
company and failed to give any notice of their intention
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to the company; and there is also no doubt that the
insurance company specifically rejected their services.
While appellant does not argue that no fee would be
Jue plaintiff's attorneys if it had simply sat on its
rights and not given them any notice, it does seem crucial
that the carrier should be able to refuse to deal with
plaintiff's attorneys if it so chooses by giving them
notice as was done in this case and retaining its own
counsel. It is therefore respectfully urged that in the
present case, plaintiff's counsel have no right to recover
as against the appellant, they having gone forward in
representation of the plaintiff knowing that they were
not entitled to represent the interest of the appellant.

POINT V.
THE ONLY EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD
SUPPORTS THE APPELLANT'S POSITION
THAT PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEYS WERE
ON NOTICE THAT THEY WERE NOT TO
REPRESENT THE APPELLANT'S INTEREST IN THE ACTION BELOW AND THAT
THEY THEN IGNORED THAT NOTICE AND
ARE NOW CLAIMING AN INVOLUNTARY
EMPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENT WITH
THE APPELLANT.
Exhibit #1 is a letter dated November 16, 1970,
addressed by a claims representative of the appellant
to Gibbons & Reed Company with carbon copies having
been sent to the plaintiff and his attorney, among others.
11

lu that letter, the parties are put on notice as tu tlit
subrogation interest of the appellant and told that th
appellant expects to participate in the terms of a111
settlement and to have its subrogation interest gin;
consideration.
Exhibit #2 is a letter from counsel for the appellu 11
to plaintiff's attorney dated September !J, rnn,
forth in detail that plaintiff's attorney or attorneys were
not to represent the interest of the appellant and that
the appellant did not expect to pay any fee to plai11ti1f1
attorneys. In spite of these notices and without an1
notification to the appellant, plaintiff's attorneys wenl
forward with the action cm behalf of the plaintiff anti
assumed to represent the appellant. It was not until the
letter of December 3, 1971, was written that any notice
was given by plaintiff's attorneys that they did not
agree with the terms set forth in the two previousl1
mentioned letters. Upon receipt of Exhibit #3, an
appearances was filed of record on behalf of the appel·
lant, Trustee of the cause of action ( R. 45).
t

Section 35-1-62 U.C.A. (1953) provides that
"When any injury or death for which compen·
sation is payable under this Title shall hHe been
caused bv the wrongful act or neglect of another
person
in the same employment, the injurea
or in the case of his death, his
ents, may claim compensation, and the
employee or his heirs or personal representative
rnav also Jiaye an action for damage against suclr
thi1:d person. If compensation is claimed
thJ
employer or insurance carrier becomes obligate
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to pay compensation, the employer or insurance
'1 1rustee of the cause of
against th.e
party and may bring and
mamtam the actwn either in its own name or the
name of the injured employee, or his heirs or the
personal representative of the deceased, provided the employer or carrier may not settle and
release the cause of action without the consent of
the Commission." (Emphasis added.)
Under the Section stated above where compensation
has been claimed or the carrier
become obligated
to pay, the insurance carrier is the Trustee of the cause
of action. That the insurance carrier is not entitled to
a windfall and have its subrogation claim remitted to
it in full without a proportionate charge for attorney's
fees and costs is clear since the decision of this court in
Worthen vs. Shurlleff and Andrews,lnc., 19 Utah 2d
20, 426 P2d 223 (1967).
The subsequent case of Graham vs. Industrial Commission, 26 Utah 2d 424, 491P2d223 (1971), affirmed
the holding in Worthen as did the most recent case
of Prettyman vs. Utah State Department of Finance,
27 Utah 2d 333, 496 P2d 80 ( 1972). These cases are
the most recent pronouncement of this court on the
question of the obligation of the Trustee of the cause
of action to pay attorney's fees for their share of the
recovery. However, in those cases ,the issue before this
Court has never been raised and that is, where the carrier
acts and puts the plaintiff's attorneys on notice that
they are not to represent the carrier and that it will
protect it own interest, what must a carrier do to prevent
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being forced into an involuntary employment arrange.
ment with plaintiff's attorneys.
In none of the cases decided to date in Utah wa1
there any indication that the
of the cause o!
action advised the plaintiff's attorneys that it woula
protect its own interest, and that it did not want them
to represent the carrier. However, in the instant case.
such notification was given by Exhibits #I and #z.
Appellant here does not take the position that ii
is not willing to pay attorney's fees and costs for the
recovery of its subrogation claim. It does take the
position, however, that it should be entitled to hire the
attorneys it wants to hire and to have the attorney-clienl
relationship that it is entitled to have with its legal
representatives. In the instant case, such relationship
did not exist and the appellant had no control over the
attorneys who now claim that they have rendered a
service to the appellant against its will and wish to be
paid for rendering that service. If that is required the
appellant will be obligated to pay a double fee for legal
services in connection with this case .
It should be noted that if the present status ol
Utah Law is allowed to remain without any clarification
the only way that a carrier will be able to protect itseh
in a third party Workmen's Compensation case woulO
be to file a lawsuit either in its own name or in the
name of the injured employee as allowed by Section
35-1-62 at the earliest moment that it is aware that it
is obligated to pay compensation. By so doing, it woulo
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appear that it has proceeded in a manner which should
protect its interest. However, this would obviously lead
tu the tiling of many lawsuits which need not be filed
and would appead not to be in the best interest of the
carriers, the injured employee or the orderly administration of justice.
There is also the strong possibility that in any given
case there can be a distinct conflict of interest between
the injured employee and the interest of the compensation carrier. This can occur where the amount available for settlement or satisfaction of a judgment is
close to or perhaps slightly more or slightly less than
the amount of the subrogation claim. Particularly in
the area of settling such a case, the interest of the
insurance company pursuant to the provisions of Section
35-1-62 U.C.A. (1953) would be to settle the case
without risking a trial if the amount offered was close
to the subrogation claim whereas the interest of the
injured employee would be to try the case as he would
have little or nothing coming upon a settlement. Under
these circumstances, the conflict which a single attorney
representing both interests would have is apparent. If
a compromise between those interests is to be reached,
it should be done by each interest being represented
separately.
It should be further noted that in the instant case,
the amount of the attorney's fee as determined by the
contract between the plaintiff and his attorney should
not be the determining factor for the amount of the
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fee that the party representing the insurance carrit
should receive. The carriers have full and complet.
files by the time a Workmen's Compensation awardl
paid. They have complete medical reports, they haveru
investigative staff which investigates the facts and a
a result, the file when turned to the attorney for
insurance company is much more complete and require
much less expenditure of effort than the same cas
being referred to plaintiff's attorney by the
Plaintiff's attorneys must, of necessity, spend mud
more time and effort in the average plaintiff's caseti
develop the facts than the attorney who receives:
completed investigation file of the insurance
In this case, the plaintiff's attorneys contend that tlli
level of compensation to which they are entitled, if an:
at all, is fixed by the contract they had with their client
This just does not follow as a matter of logic. In
instant case, the record does not support and in fac
there was no arrangement of any kind between
appellant and plaintiff's attorneys.

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully urges that the Court £nr
that the plaintiff's attorneys were given notice thii
they were not to represent the appellant and that the1
are not entitled under the facts of this case to claiml
fee as against the compensation carrier's share of
recovery. If the Court cannot make such a findmi,
then it is respectfully urged that the matter be
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to the court below with instructions to dismiss the
"Petition" filed herein which would leave the plaintiff's
attorneys free to file their complaint in a separate proceeding against the appellant wherein discovery can be
had and testimony can be taken which will furnish an
evidentiary basis for a decision herein.
Respectfully submitted,
MOFFAT, WELLING, TAYLOR
& PAULSEN
Richard H. Moffat
9th Floor Tribune Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Intervenor-Appellant
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